

Ethnoterritorial Concurrence and Imperfect Federalism in Spain

Luis Moreno

Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados
(CSIC)

Abstract

The political and spatial reorganization brought about by the progressive consolidation of the Spanish *Estado de las Autonomías* ('State of Autonomies') is in line with a model of multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence and imperfect federalism analysed in this paper. The model relates socio-political sub-state ethnic mobilization with the competitive interplay among Spanish regions and nationalities in pursuit of political and economic power, as well as for the achievement of legitimisation for their institutional development.

A succinct review and interpretation of some of the main developments in Spain's modern history is carried out in the first section of this paper. A reference is made to the upsurge of ethnoterritorial political movements which took place in Spain during the 1970s and which coincided with a challenge to the hypercentralist state enforced by General Franco's Dictatorship. With the subsequent transition to democracy, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 adopted a quasi-federal structure more in line with the pluriethnic nature of Spanish society.

The persistence of a dual self-identification expressed by citizens in the Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas* (nationalities and regions) is one of the main features of centre-periphery relations in democratic Spain. This 'dual identity' or 'compound nationality' incorporates -in variable proportions, individually or subjectively asserted- both state/national and ethnoterritorial identities with no apparent exclusion. It characterizes the ambivalent and dynamic nature of ethnopolitics in Spain.

The Spanish model of multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence and imperfect federalism incorporates social, economic and political elements in a vigorous and heterogeneous manner. This paper reviews some of the main features which have set the type of plural competition and solidarity put into play in Spain at the turn of the millennium. The model may perhaps prove useful for other countries of a plural ethnoterritorial composition.

1. Introduction.

The revival of ethnoterritorial political movements has coincided with an increasing challenge to the centralist model of the unitary state. Yet, the issues of decentralization, ethnicity, federation, and the more general debate on the territorial dimension of power have very often remained isolated on the academic fringe. Theories related to these issues have frequently been constraint to the discussion of the efficiency or inefficiency of state institutions in the provision of public services. Such partial treatment has minimized the comprehensive study of: (1) The formation of modern states (state building and national integration); (2) The intergovernmental relations within the boundaries of the polity; and (3) The crisis in the legitimacy of the political institutions of the nation-state.

In the case of Spain, as in other pluriethnic states, federalism is a form of government which seeks to articulate a response to the **stimuli** of the diversity or plurality of society, comprising cultural/ethnic groups with differences of language, history or traditions which can also be reflected in the party system. Countries like Spain, with marked territorial cleavages, incorporate plural qualities which make the federalist paradigm an indispensable tool for social interpretation and political accommodation.

The individual elements of space and ethnicity are, together with class, responsible for most of the division and cohesion in contemporary world. The functional dimension of society is of decisive importance in all aspects of human organisation, being class stratification a necessary element in the analysis of any social formation. However, the assessment of ethnoterritorial particularities is of no less importance for both the understanding of the nature of politics in multinational states -as is the case of Spain- and for the ascertainment of the processes of social mobilization and social change which they may undergo.

In the case of Spain, the persistence of a **dual identity** or **compound nationality** reveals the ambivalent nature of the internal ethnic relations that have existed in recent times. According to the cultural pluralist approach to ethnicity -the one with a higher degree of accord and plausibility in the case of Spain-, the emphasis is not merely placed on the distinctiveness but rather on those relationships of interaction between the different ethnoterritorial groups within the state. Some authors consider that political accommodation to secure political and institutional stability in pluriethnic societies or polyarchies is almost impossible and is bound to result in either the break-up of the state or the consolidation of a type of hegemonic authoritarianism for the control of the state's unity¹. On the contrary, ethnoterritorial co-operation and agreement may not only overcome conflicts and divergence within plural polities but can also provide a deepening of democracy by means of a more effective access of civil society to political decision-making, something which in the case of Spain overlaps with its internal ethnic and cultural diversity.

In the first section of this paper a succinct review and interpretation of some of the main developments in Spain's modern history will set the pave for a subsequent discussion on the Spanish *Estado de las Autonomías* ('State of Autonomies'), the

model of 'multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence', the concept of 'dual identity', and the prospects of 'imperfect federalism' in Spain.

2. The territorial dimension in Spanish history.

Spain is a national state made up of nationalities and regions and, as such, has a pluriethnic composition (see Table 2 for basic data on regional share of Spanish GDP and population)². Political unification began in 1469 with the marriage of the monarchs Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, once the 'Reconquest' of the Iberian territories under Moorish control was nearly completed³. This process of territorial aggregation ensured the maintenance of the diverse pre-union units: kingdoms, principalities and feudal dominions. It also preserved the institutional forms of self-government in various areas of the monarchy: the Aragonese Confederation (which included the Principality of Catalonia), the Kingdom of Castile and Leon, and the Kingdom of Navarre⁴. The incorporation of these territories into the Hispanic monarchy took place in the early days of modern European history and long before the homogenizing despotism of other European monarchies was put into effect.

The varying ability to make sense of the pluriethnic nature of the Spanish polity highly influenced the state-building policies pursued in the 16th and 17th centuries by the Habsburg kings. Later, during the 18th and 19th centuries, the French model of a single nation-state was favoured by the Bourbon kings and by the supporters of the Enlightenment in Spain. This new Spanish polity aimed to transcend the internal borders of the old kingdoms, principalities and dominions which the advocates of the Enlightenment and their heirs considered remnants of a past which only served to hinder the modernization of the country. Their policies of nation-formation were geared to the assimilation of all Spanish territories into the cultural and political patterns of Castile. To this end, they deployed a programme of a centralising nature - not altogether dissimilar from the cases of "galicization" and "anglicization" in France and Great Britain, respectively- but which achieved very partially their original goals.

In the Spain of the 19th century, the process of industrialization first took place in two peripheral areas: Catalonia and the Basque Country. This process further reinforced their sense of being distinct ethnoterritorial entities and, as a consequence of this, an element of differentiation prevailed upon that of nation-state homogenization. As a result of this particular historical process, state-building in Spain did not involve a successful national integration of the pre-existing communities. In this respect, Spain offers a striking example of the shortcomings of the diffusionist/functionalist theoretical model⁵.

In modern times, Spain's territorial unity has been put under strain by the centrifugal action of its ethnic and linguistic diversity, as well as by that of either weak state institutions or violent central rule. Moreover, there has been a traditional lack of congruence or even "non-congruence" between political and economic powers⁶. Catalonia and the Basque Country, the two northern peripheral Spanish communities with full ethnic potential, have remained as two of the most dynamic economies of Spain. However, their political protagonism in the running of the state's affairs has been very limited. This political and economic "non-congruence" has traditionally

nourished the centrifugal tendencies present in modern Spanish history, tendencies which found expression in a number of armed conflicts: the Revolt of the Reapers, 1640-1652; the War of the Spanish Succession, 1701-1714; the Carlist wars, 1833-1840, 1846-1848 and 1872-1875; the Tragic Week of Barcelona, 1909 and, finally, the Civil War, 1936-1939.

Late modernization, regional industrialization, peripheral nationalism, weak state institutions, deep class differences and poverty were among the main features of Spanish society at the turn of the 19th century. However, these aspects did not coalesce into the "two Spains" the poet Antonio Machado alluded to when referring to the internal confrontation which culminated in the Civil War (1936-1939). Instead, class and territorial differences produced a set of multiple and interlocked conflicts. Furthermore, collective interests and confrontations did not reflect a simple model of centre-periphery duality.

The political attempts by the Spanish Second Republic (1931-1939) to pave the way for the resolution of ethnoterritorial conflicts were of paramount importance. The Constitution of 1932 adopted a regional model of territorial organization which provided the framework for the subsequent granting of Autonomy Statutes to Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia⁷. Both anticlerical and ethnoterritorial issues played a crucial role in the process of political polarization prior to the Spanish Civil War; even within the Republican forces the dilemma between regionalism and centralism created considerable controversy and turmoil. In the end, the enemies of liberal democracy in the Spain of the 1930s managed, by means of a military uprising, to destroy any possible consensus concerning the territorial articulation of the various Spanish nationalities and regions.

2.1. Hypercentralisation under General Franco's Dictatorship.

After a cruel Civil War a reactionary centralist coalition led by General Franco took full control of the rule of Spain with "imperialist" claims: *Por el imperio hacia Dios*, ("God's Empire") and *España, una unidad de destino en lo universal* ("Spain, a unit of destiny in the universal") were mottoes used as propaganda within a general policy of cultural standardization. This was also carried out for the purposes of attempting to destroy the ethnic, regional and cultural diversity of Spain. These mottoes reflected the kind of clerical fascism advocated by the official ideology of early Francoism.

In fact, there were two *bêtes noires* for Franco's regime. The first was communism. Like all other fascist regimes, Francoism deployed a tireless anti-communist propaganda which was reinforced by the decisive support given by the USA Governments to the Dictatorship after the agreement signed in 1953 between Franco and Eisenhower. Communism -together with the so-called "Judaeo-Masonic" conspiracy- posed not only an evil threat to Spain but to "Christian Western civilization" as a whole. The second was the phenomenon of territorial secession or separatism. For Franco any degree of regional home rule was considered secessionist. The foundations of the "new" post-1939 Spain were based upon the "sacred unity of the homeland". This pursuit of national unity in detriment of the cultural varieties inherent in Spanish nationalities and regions, degenerated into an obsessive dogma deployed by the reactionary coalition which ruled Spain from 1939 until 1976⁸.

For Francoist supporters "eternal and imperial Spain" was the ideological expression of an old and unpolluted "Castilian spirit" with a universal language and ideals beyond the limits of time and space -a Spain, in short, which had emerged victorious and misunderstood in the midst of a turbulent era for mankind. Francoism regarded the Spanish ethnoterritorial peculiarities as quaint signs of the unique Spanish "soul". Any deviation from this Spanish *Volkgeist* was not only illegitimate but also dangerous and punishable. The ethnic reality was, however, very different from such a view. In fact, Franco's Dictatorship provoked the opposite effect to such centralist state-moulding: one obvious consequence of the attempts to erode Spanish communal identities was their intensification. External threats and conflicts often lead to both internal cohesion and mobilization. They usually bring together classes and interest groups which otherwise have little in common with each other or whose aims are mutually antagonistic: "That is why nationalism appeals to the solidarity of the non-solidary"⁹.

With its cultural and linguistic oppression of non-Castilian territories, Francoism turned out to be the best incentive for peripheral nationalism and regionalism in Spain. With the partial exception of Alava and Navarre, northern provinces which provided a great number of supporters (Carlists) to Franco's forces in 1936, Francoism devoted itself to imposing homogenous centralism for nearly 40 years. This implied the enforcement of policies aimed at suppressing the publication of newspapers or books in Spanish languages other than Castilian; banning all institutions of self-government and prohibiting the teaching and use of minority languages such as Catalan, Basque and Galician. From the 1960s, Francoism reinforced its commitment to uniformity by means of the instrumentalization of powerful mass media such as television.

Franco's regime maintained the arbitrary provincial administration introduced by Javier de Burgos in 1833, following the model of the French *départements*. In 1927 the number of Spanish provinces rose to fifty. The government of the provinces or *Diputaciones* acted basically as agents of central government and carried out functions as political controllers of the municipalities. These, in turn, were empowered to deal with most local activities such as town planning, sanitation and recreation. The members of the city and town councils (*ayuntamientos*) were appointed directly by the central authorities until the late 1960s when some were allowed to be "elected" by municipal residents.

The number of municipalities in 1900 was 9,287. This figure dropped in 1975 to a total of 8,194 of which three quarters (6,000 approximately) had fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. In the early 1960s the two main Spanish cities, Madrid and Barcelona, were awarded special charters giving them additional fiscal powers and responsibilities over urban planning, the water supply, transport and sanitation, among others¹⁰. As far as the regions were concerned, no political or administrative arrangement was introduced during Franco's Dictatorship.

By the end of the 1970s, a growing sense of popular grievance was gradually gathering strength in peripheral areas. Regions which had never expressed any desire for self-government were becoming inclined towards it: the Canary and Balearic Islands, as well as Asturias and Extremadura, began to put forward their

claims for territorial home rule. The reasons for the upsurge of home rule demands all over Spain -a phenomenon which included regions such as Leon and Castile- have to be sought in a widespread popular reaction against hypercentralist Francoism. This reaction went hand in hand with the struggle for the recovery of democratic liberties in Spain. In the so-called "historical" nationalities (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia) the democratic opposition forces to Franco's regime articulated a political discourse which denounced the lack of democracy and the Francoist attack on local identities and aspirations to self-government, effectively combining both democratic and national quests. In this way, the all-embracing ideology of self-government and political decentralization was unanimously accepted by all the democratic forces.

2.2. The democratic transition and the '*Estado de las Autonomías*'.

After the death of Franco in 1975 the transitional process to democracy in Spain began in earnest¹¹. The democratic parties did not have a clear-cut model for the type of decentralized state they broadly advocated. However, the majority wanted home rule for all the Spanish nationalities and regions. The constitutional expression of such a strong platform presented a great political challenge, for Spanish modern history had witnessed tragic failures where ethnicity and the territorial sharing of power were concerned.

The wide inter-party political consensus which made the drawing up of the 1978 Constitution possible, also brought with it an element of ambiguity in the formulation of the territorial organization of the Spanish State. In fact, two different conceptions of Spain, which had traditionally confronted each other, were formulated. Subsequently, a *via media* was negotiated and explicitly recognized by the Constitution: on the one hand, the idea of an indivisible and solely Spanish nation-state, on the other, a concept of Spain as an ensemble of diverse peoples, historic nations and regions.

The text of the 1978 Constitution reflects many of the tensions and political dilemmas which existed in the discussion of such territorial provisions. However, it also reflects a widespread desire to reach political agreement among all the constituent political parties which were involved in the process of negotiation. An open model of 'imperfect federalism' was the consequent result for the territorial organization of democratic Spain.

Accordingly, Title VIII of the 1978 Spanish Constitution made it possible for one, three, all of none of the *Comunidades Autónomas* to be self-governed. It depended on the political will expressed by the inhabitants of each nationality or region (*Comunidad Autónoma*), or by their political representatives. It also made it possible for the degree of self-government to be wide or restricted according to the wishes of the nationalities and regions. These could assume decentralised powers and organize themselves in either a homogeneous or heterogeneous way. Finally, the possible political "mistakes" made during the process of decentralization could also be rectified in time¹².

Conservatives, Centrists, Nationalists, Socialists and Communists hammered out an agreement of a type of 'quasi' or 'imperfect' federalism which would not jeopardize the delicate constitutional consensus on the issue of decentralization, the most

delicate to be agreed upon in the constituent period after the demise of Francoism (1975-1978). Hence, the accepted solution took the form of an unwritten pledge to extend the procedures of political transaction into the future. As stated above, this open model of 'imperfect federalism' did not presuppose the ways and means by which the different spatial entities could finally be articulated. Thus, an implicit desire was expressed by the "Fathers" of the 1978 Constitution to provide the procedures and degrees of self-government to be pursued by the nationalities and regions while allowing them a high degree of flexibility. The formulation of a clear division of powers based upon "orthodox" federal techniques was, however, avoided.

The arbitrating role of the *Tribunal Constitucional*¹³, the highest court in Spain, has been of paramount importance for the subsequent implementation of the *Estado de las Autonomías* ('State of Autonomies'). It has amongst its attributes the capacity to decide in conflicts of jurisdiction between the State (central government) and the Autonomous Communities (nationalities and regions), or among the Autonomous Communities themselves. According to the 1978 Constitution there is a need for compromise on the nomination of candidates to the Constitutional Court¹⁴. This circumstance provides the highest Court with a great deal of authority and independence. Some critics have pointed out that the role of the Constitutional Court in solving disputes relating to governmental power places electoral bodies in a position which is subordinate to the judiciary. Consequently, they argue, there is a risk that judges may become political and that their known political views are taken into account when they are appointed.

In Spain, the need for a pact between Government and Opposition in the election of the members of the *Tribunal Constitucional* has so far proved to be a barrier against open political sectarianism in the nomination of the candidates. For instance, the important judgement of the Court on the LOAPA Act ('Organic Law on the Harmonization of the Autonomical Process') passed by the Spanish Parliament, reinforced the open and federal-like interpretation of the 1978 Constitution very much against the views of centre-right UCD and centre-left PSOE Governments in the early 1980s.

The LOAPA Act was to a great extent the result of a joint action by the then two main political parties (UCD and PSOE) which was highly conditioned by the political conjuncture. Let us remember that early Catalan and Basque moves towards self-government sparked off, in the late 1970s, similar initiatives by other Spanish nationalities and regions which did not wish to be left behind. In the summer of 1981, and after the attempted military *coup d'État* of 23rd February 1981, both the UCD Government and the main PSOE parliamentary opposition felt the need to "harmonize" the process of decentralisation along the lines of the German model of co-operative federalism. This UCD-PSOE pact sought the unilateral co-ordination of the decentralization process from the central administration, a political view which turned out to be a massive miscalculation.

When the legislative inception of the LOAPA law was attempted (1981-1982), all the Nationalist parties, together with the Communists and, to a much lesser extent, the Conservatives, were fiercely opposed to it. Indeed, the timing and content of such harmonizing policies from the centre, when the structure of the centralist Francoist State still remained largely untouched, was inopportune and inappropriate. In fact, if

the type of 'imperfect federalism' were to succeed in Spain, the political gravity in the centre-periphery political relationship could in no way be placed exclusively in the core of the polity, particularly in a country where all non-democratic regimes had been centralist and where the economically powerful periphery had traditionally been neglected in the process of political decision-making.

Once the first centralist *tour de force* -deployed by politicians and state officials - was offset by the decision of the Constitutional Court against the main provisions of the LOAPA, the transfer of powers accelerated. It was practically completed after the Socialist victory of 1982 (see Table 1), according to the provisions of the home rule statutes approved in nationalities and regions. Since then, the whole process has not been free from bureaucratic friction and interference, a result of an ingrained centralist mentality extended among central bodies and institutions which have continued to deploy -although unsuccessfully- their "harmonizing" proposals and attitudes whenever possible.

In the general process of decentralization during the 1980s the case of the southern region of Andalusia is of particular relevance and deserves closer, although brief, attention. In 1982, political leaders and the population at large in Andalusia opted for the same procedure and degree of home rule previously pursued by the three so-called historical nationalities: Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. The result of the popular referendum held in Andalusia ratified these wishes and, furthermore, such a 'demonstration effect' sparked off a sense of ethnic competition for other regions in pursuit of equal access to home rule. This development brought about a crucial element of heterogeneity which modified the model, implicitly accepted by Catalan and Basque nationalists, of implementing only home rule in the Spanish historical nationalities while the rest of the regions would merely be granted administrative decentralization ('de-concentration').

During the 'Socialist decade'¹⁵, the process of decentralisation embodied in the 1978 Spanish Constitution has undergone a long process of consolidation. However, a new set of conflicts has emerged which has gradually shaped a model of 'multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence'¹⁶. This is basically defined by three 'principles', three 'premises', two 'rules' and two 'axioms' which are, thus, the main constituent elements of the Spanish case of 'imperfect federalism':

-The principle of **democratic decentralisation** interrelates both the development of democratic liberties and the decentralisation of power. Let us remember that throughout Spain, and in particular in the so-called 'historical nationalities' (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia), the struggle against dictatorship was also a reaction against Francoist attempts to destroy ethnoterritorial markers such as language, cultural traditions or self-governed institutions.

-The principle of **comparative grievance** determines the mobilization patterns for the Spanish nationalities and regions. Thus, the right to home rule is the result of an 'ethnic competition' in search of an equal access to political and economic power, as well as for the achievement of legitimisation for the institutions of self-government.

-The principle of **inter-territorial solidarity** is a constitutional precept which reflects a more prosaic reality: the transfer of financial resources from wealthier to poorer

regions of Spain. This aims at achieving a common basic level in the provision of services to all Spaniards¹⁷.

-The premise¹⁸ of **differential origin** recognises the historical rights of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, sub-state nationalities whose own languages are different from Spanish ('Castilian') and are also 'official' according to the Constitution.

-The premise of **ethnoterritorial mimesis** has induced the 'historical nationalities' to replicate the powers and symbols of the Spanish central state. Subsequently, the regions with 'earlier' aspirations for home rule (Andalusia, Valencia, the Canary Islands) have attempted to 'imitate' the 'historical nationalities'. Late-comer regions have followed the same pattern in regard with those 'early rising' regions.

-The premise of the **meso-governmental patronage** establishes a higher degree for regional elites to carry out corporatist practices of co-optation and negotiation. These capacities are grounded in the increasing budgetary manoeuvrability of the self-governed institutions (Note that between 1978 and 1992, central expenditure decreased from 90% to 65%; regional spending increased from nil to 21%; and local government expenditure rose from 10% to 13%) (See Table 3 for a comparison of the territorial sharing of public spending in unitary and federal countries, Spain included).

-The rule of **spatial centrifugal pressure** refers to the instrumentalization of political demands exerted upon central power by politicians and policy-makers based in the *Comunidades Autónomas* in order to increase their relative share of power. This has been carried out not only by nationalist and regionalist parties but also by regional and/or federated branches of the main Spanish political formations (PSOE, PP, IU).

-The rule of the **inductive allocation of powers** in the Spanish process of decentralisation acknowledges the absence of a clear-cut constitutional division of powers in the three-tier system of government (local, regional, and central). The process of decentralisation in Spain has developed as an 'open model' which can only be determined in a gradual and inductive manner¹⁹.

-The axiom of the **politicizing of ethnoterritorial institutions** is associated with the practices of political rivalry among the three layers of government in pursuit of maximizing their political image and performance. This exercise of political rent-seeking is not only carried out for domestic purposes but as a means of attracting interest and investments from abroad²⁰.

-The axiom of **conflicting intergovernmental relations** is related to the diversity in the political colouring at each of the three levels of government²¹. Conflict and agreement are present in intergovernmental relations in Spain as in any other federal state and are bound to remain as the most characteristic feature of the -yet unfinished- Spanish process of decentralisation.

3. Imperfect federalism and dual identity.

The federal principle is based on a combination of self-rule and shared rule and is concerned with the establishment of political and social institutions through contractual arrangements²². 'Classic' examples of modern federalism are based upon the federal distribution of power within a country inhabited by a single people (Federal Republic of Germany) or based upon the distribution of power among constituent units each of which represents different peoples (India)²³. The case of Spain, however, fits more adequately into a second variety of federalism which serves the purpose of accommodating internal diversity, often in multinational or pluriethnic states²⁴. This diversity of units is of an ethnoterritorial nature rather than a non-territorial one.

The 'imperfect' nature of Spanish federalism is based on the characterising elements already examined as regards the model of 'multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence'. As far as the institutional outcome of the process of decentralisation in Spain is concerned, the 'inductive allocation of powers' is the most underlying characteristic. Unlike the traditional philosophy which has patterned the making of other federal states on a deductive basis (the USA, the FRG or Australia), the Spanish model of "imperfect federalism" will require a long process of power delimitation before its federal-like arrangements take shape within a future European Confederation. Once this situation has been achieved, a constitutional revision should functionally incorporate these divisions of powers so avoiding the great political difficulties which would have occurred had the process developed inversely.

The degree of ethnoterritorial consent and dissent in 'autonomical' Spain has in the concept of **dual identity** -or **compound nationality**- a useful methodological tool for measurement and interpretation. This concept concerns the way citizens identify themselves in sub-state communities within pluriethnic polities. It incorporates -in variable proportions, individually or subjectively asserted- the local/ethnoterritorial ascriptive identity and the state/national identity produced by national integration -or, rather, malintegration- in the process of state-building²⁵.

The dual identity concept provides a crucial element for the understanding and assessment of political conflict and ethnoterritorial politics in contemporary Spain. As Juan Linz has observed:

"...Spain today is a state for all Spaniards, a nation-state for a large part of the Spanish population, and only a state but not a nation for important minorities"²⁶.

Indeed, the quest for self-government by sub-state communities is in full accordance with the variable manifestation of such duality: the more the primordial ethnoterritorial identity prevails upon modern state identity, the higher the demands for political autonomy. Conversely, the more characterised the state-national identity is, the less likely it would be for ethnoterritorial conflict to appear. At the extreme, complete absence of one of the two elements of dual identity would lead to a socio-political fracture in the pluriethnic state, and demands for self-government would probably take the form of self-determination. In other words, when citizens in a sub-state community identify themselves in an exclusive manner, the institutional outcome of such antagonism will also tend to be exclusive.

In any case, the task of identifying and measuring both cultural and juridical categories involved in the concept of dual identity/compound nationality is not simple. The changing nature implicit in such a duality complicates matters. Thus, positive perceptions on the action of the Spanish state by members of a sub-state community can result in a loosening of their adscriptive local identity and a corresponding reinforcement of their sense of membership within the Spanish nation-state, and vice-versa. Obviously, the dual identity concept modifies its constituent elements according to subjective perceptions and evaluations. In fact the reinforcement of one identity upon the other may well result in the complete disappearance of such compound nationality as it now stands.

The existence of this 'compound nationality' in most of the Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas* had its institutional correlation in the setting-up during the 1980s of regional legislatures and governments which have not only preserved local identities but have also projected the aspirations of such sub-state communities. In the past the maintenance of regional ethnocultural peculiarities in Spain was the result, at least partially, of the inefficiency and weakness of the centralising forces. Since the approval by popular referendum of the 1978 Constitution, such cultural diversity has been greatly encouraged by the regional governments of the *Comunidades Autónomas* which have implemented educational and linguistic policies²⁷.

Percentages concerning self-identification by Spaniards in the period 1990-1993 indicate that between one third and one fourth of all Spaniards have expressed a 'single' identity with respect to either state/national or local/ethnoterritorial dimensions ('Only Spanish' or 'Only Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castilian, etc'). In turn, a degree of 'dual identity' has been expressed by between two thirds and three quarters of the total Spanish citizenship ("More 'Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castilian, etc' than..."; "Equally 'Andalusian, Basque, Catalan, Castilian, etc' and Spanish"; and "More 'Spanish than 'Andalusian, Basque Catalan, Castilian, etc'").

Note that between one quarter and one fifth of the total Spanish population regard themselves exclusively as 'Spaniards', whereas around one tenth identify themselves only as 'Andalusians, Basques, Catalans, Castilians, etc.'. As regards the Basque Country is worth underlining that, despite the climate of political violence induced by ETA terrorism, the number of Basques expressing a degree of 'dual identity' has remained stable without great oscillations in recent years. However, the percentage of those who identify themselves 'exclusively' as Basques (between one quarter and one third of the total Basque population) marks a clear deviation with respect to 'single identity' figures in the whole of Spain (10 per cent, approximately).

In some of the Spanish regions the variations among the diverse options included in the 'dual identity' category are coincident with or can be explained -although partially- by the emergence and consolidation of newly-constituted regionalist parties. The task of relating these modifications in citizens' self-identification with the electoral support given to these new political formations has been little studied by political scientists in Spain. It remains as an important analytical work to be undertaken for the understanding of the relationship between ethnoterritorial self-assertion and electoral voting patterns.

3.1. Pending reforms at the turn of the millennium.

After a dozen years of autonomy in the Spanish nationalities and regions, the balance can be evaluated as very encouraging as far as ethnic accommodation in plurinational Spain is concerned. However three major institutional disfunctionalities still remain and need to be settled in the foreseeable future:

(a) **Territorialization of the Senate.** The 1978 Constitution considers the Senate as the Upper House of territorial representation in Spain²⁸. In actual fact, however, the Senate embodies in its outlook the *cohabitation* of the two models of paracentralism and parafederalism which are present in the 1978 Constitution. In practical terms, its main instrumental value has so far been to provide the government and opposition parties with a "second opportunity" to reach agreement upon Bills previously passed in the Lower House. The factor which clearly distorts the territorial composition of the Senate is the electoral (over-) representation given to the provinces instead of the strengthening of the role of the *Comunidades Autónomas*. Without the latter configuration, it is, therefore, rather inappropriate to speak of a House of territorial representation dealing with autonomical matters as embodied in the 1978 Constitution.

(b) **Re-definition of the political roles of the provinces.** The provinces, as administrative units, were created in Spain in 1833, following the territorial model designed by Javier de Burgos and based upon the Napoleonic *départaments*. The province was, in fact, designed with the centralising aim of coordinating the peripheral organization of the state and, more importantly, of breaking the regional Spanish mould of traditional kingdoms and distinctive regions. With the implementation of the 1978 Constitution, the territorial overlapping between *Comunidades Autónomas* and provinces has brought about an element of political discrimination, since seven of the seventeen Autonomous Communities are *uniprovinciales*, that is, they only comprise the territory of one province. These regions have been able to combine both autonomical and provincial administration very naturally and, consequently, in such territories there is *de facto* a three-tier system of government, i.e. local, regional and central. The same cannot be said of the remaining ten *Comunidades Autónomas* whose situation is aggravated by the fact that the provincial tier of government is felt to be both artificial and centrally imposed in nationalities like Catalonia. In another *Comunidad Autónoma*, namely the Basque Country, the provinces, under the denomination of "Historical Territories", constitute a peculiar model of internal territorial confederation.

A future re-definition of the "province" should be much in line with the 1873 Spanish Federal Constitution which first granted autonomy to the regions in order to maintain, modify or eliminate the provincial administration. Furthermore, the functions of the provincial *Diputaciones* (provincial councils) could be re-allocated as peripheral administrations of the *Comunidades Autónomas*, whose governments are constantly tempted to take on the rationale of "efficiency" and adopt a attitude of 're-centralization' within each *Comunidad Autónoma*. This option should confront the hot issue of eliminating the provincial elections for the *Diputaciones* and re-adapting the autonomical representation of such provincial territories. Otherwise, the future electoral situation in Spain could be one of political exhaustion with local, provincial, regional, national and European elections taking place every four years.

(c) **Division of powers and the peripheral administration of the State.** The federal technique for the distribution of political powers and financial resources, together with the general objective of reconciling both the highest level of decentralization and the necessary intergovernmental co-ordination, appear as a consequential outcome of the building of the Spanish *Estado de las Autonomías*. An institutional challenge to deal with in this slow political process concerns the gradual reduction in size of the peripheral administration of the State, namely the weight of central government in the Autonomous Communities. Once again, the assumption of political principles is prior to the working out of technical arrangements. The rationale which should preside over future processes regards local and regional governments as genuine representatives of the state in their respective territorial limits and, in doing so, puts forward the principle of 'subsidiarity' and 'indirect administration'. Ideally, executive functions would not be duplicated and carried out simultaneously by the peripheral state administration and regional and local governments²⁹. In other words, not only would the Spanish State implement its regional and local policies through regional and local councils, but the future European Federation would too.

(d) **Optimization of financial resources and inter-regional solidarity.** In Spain, as in other advanced Western societies with ethnoterritorial conflicts, the accommodation of cultural peculiarities and economic differences is related to the task of bringing together policies of interregional solidarity and greater horizontal decision-making and consultation. As far as the intervention of the state is concerned, the implementation of corporatist policies of regional redistribution from the centre of the polity has often failed to close the gap between those regions better equipped to develop economic potentialities and those lagging behind. Such a technocratic approach, instrumentalized at the top level of state decision-making, is likely to perpetuate the geographical distribution of economic power, if only because priorities for the general economic development of the country as a whole usually rest upon areas of growth already developed³⁰.

The economic and financial decentralization process has also been significant. According to the objectives set by the ruling Socialist Party (PSOE), public expenditure figures at the end of the process of decentralization (unlikely before the turn of the millennium) should be 50% for the central government and 25% each for the regional and municipal governments. The changes so far in this direction (between 1978 and 1992) are: central expenditure down from 90 % to 65%; regional spending up from nil to 21%; and local (municipal) government spending up from 10% to 13% (See Table 3).

There are two different systems for the financing of the *Comunidades Autónomas*. One is called the "common regime" and the other the "special regime". The latter applies to the Basque Country and Navarre and the former to the other 15 Autonomous Communities. The main sources of revenue for the regions under the 'common regime' status are a tax-sharing grant, ceded taxes³¹ and a number of specific grants.

The Basque Country and Navarre, whose system of financing falls under the denomination of "special regime", have arrangements which could be labelled as "fiscal quasi-independence". They raise monies through a number of taxes which

include personal income tax, corporation tax and value-added tax. A previously agreed quota is annually handed over to the central government in compensation for the non-territorial common Spanish services as well as for the costs incurred by those central government agencies operating in the territories under the provisions of the "special regime" (24). This special regime is highly inadequate from the viewpoint of horizontal equalization with respect to the other fifteen Autonomous Communities.

The reform of the system for financing the fifteen *Comunidades Autónomas* of the "common regime" is in the process of political negotiation. The challenge facing these negotiations between regional and central governments is that of providing a more stable and functional framework for co-operation, as well as facilitating technical solutions for a more effective level of horizontal equalization so that economic disparities among regions can be reduced. Note that, although the 1978 Constitution established the *Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial* ('Inter-territorial Compensation Fund') as a mechanism to bring about horizontal equalization, the lack of positive discrimination in favour of the poorer regions has meant that all 15 *Comunidades Autónomas* of the 'common regime' have access to capital grant funding³².

The main discussion is focused on the direct transfer to the *Comunidades Autónomas* of a percentage (15%-20%) of the Income Tax accrued by the central Treasury in their respective territories. Regional governments could also have the possibility of levying their own surcharges on the Income Tax to be collected in their regions³³.

(e) Further access to devolved powers for 'late-comer' regions. Discussion of the reform of the financing system of the Spanish *Comunidades Autónomas* has been closely related to the more transcendent political reform which will allow the regions to have access to new devolved powers. The differences in degree of self-government in the group of the eleven regions which gained regional autonomy at a slower pace *vis-à-vis* the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia ('historical nationalities'), Andalusia, the Canary Islands and Valencia have generated a widespread regional desire to obtain further transfer of powers from the centre.

Note that in 1989 about half of all expenditure related to the administration of powers already transferred to the 15 *Comunidades Autónomas* of the 'common regime' was distributed to three of them. This situation has generated grievance in the 'later-comer' groups of self-governed regions. Based on this and other political factors, many 'Autonomous Communities' have seen the appearance or consolidation of regionalist parties, some of which have obtained considerable electoral support (e.g. *Partido Andalucista*, *Partido Aragonés Regionalista*, *Unión Valenciana*, *Unión Mallorquina*, *Unión Para el Progreso de Cantabria*, *Coalición Canaria*, *Extremadura Unida*, among others). The two powers which the aforementioned 'late-comer' regions aim at incorporating into their action of government are health and education, areas which carry a great deal of political and budgetary significance.

During 1992, a pact between the two main political parties in Spain (PSOE and PP) established the direct transfer or delegation of powers according to Art. 150 of the 1978 Constitution to the 'late-comer' regions. Around the mid-1990s this new devolution of powers will have to be completed.

4. Conclusion.

Some countries face a national dilemma. Spain has rather a dilemma of nationalities. Such a dilemma is chiefly cultural and political. Inter-regional disparities tend to reinforce ethnoterritorial cleavages. Not surprisingly contemporary regionalism and peripheral nationalism have emerged in many cases as a consequence of state economic inequality and centre-periphery imbalances.

The *Estado de las Autonomías* has transcended to a large extent the traditional cultural patterns of ethnic confrontation in Spain. Despite its secular ethnic conflicts, Spain is one entity clearly identifiable as a historical unity. This unity goes beyond the simple aggregation of territories and peoples with no other affinity than their coexistence under the rule of one common monarch or political power. Spain is then a 'nation of nations'. The social and cultural cohesion which makes up her unity does not however obliterate internal oppositions. As has happened in the past, territorial rivalries among Spanish nationalities and regions have brought about an extra cultural incentive for creativity and civilization, but they have also been used as an excuse for open confrontation. Spain has gone through a substantial social, economic and political transformation during the last fifteen years. The Spaniards have nevertheless renewed their commitment to live together something which constitutes the essential element of federalism.

The Spanish model of 'multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence' incorporates social, economic and political elements in a dynamic and heterogeneous manner. These are at the basis of the 'imperfect' nature of Spanish federalism and are mainly responsible for the type of plural competence and solidarity put into play in decentralised Spain at the turn of the millennium.

In the years to come, the continuing process of federalization in Spain will have to involve horizontal consultation at the centre of the polity, thus, strengthening institutions like the Economic and Social Council³⁴ and other similar sectorial conferences. The Senate should also be redefined as the Upper House for territorial and legislative matters of specific regional content. This process of decentralization and home rule now faces a double challenge, that of co-ordinating intergovernmental relations and that of deepening democracy. The latter can best be done through the more effective access of civil society to political decision-making both in Spain and in the European framework which is gradually transcending the political boundaries of its constituent nation-states.

Table 1: General election results for the Chamber of Deputies (1977-1993).

	<u>1977</u>		<u>1979</u>		<u>1982</u>		<u>1986</u>		<u>1989</u>		<u>1993</u>	
	Votes (%)	MPs (#)										
Socialist Party (PSOE)	29.3	118	30.5	121	48.4	202	43.4	184	39.6	176	38.7	159
Popular Party (PP)	8.3	16	6.0	9	26.4	106	26.0	105	25.8	106	34.8	141
Union of Democratic Centre (UCD)	34.6	165	35.9	168	6.9	12	---	---	---	---	---	---
Democratic and Social Centre (CDS)	---	---	---	---	2.9	2	9.2	19	7.9	14	1.8	---
Communist Party/ United Left (PCE/IU)	4	20	0.8	23	3.9	4	4.7	7	9.0	17	9.6	18
Convergence and Union (CiU)	2.8	11	2.7	8	3.7	12	5.0	18	5.0	18	4.9	17
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)	1.7	8	1.5	7	1.9	8	1.5	6	1.2	5	1.2	5
Peoples' Unity (HB)	---	---	1.0	3	1.0	2	1.1	5	1.1	4	0.8	2
Basque Left (EE)	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.5	1	0.5	2	0.5	2	---	---
Basques' Reunion (EA)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.7	2	0.6	1

Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)	0.8	1	0.7	1	0.7	1	---	---	---	---	0.8	1
Andalusian Party (PA)	0.2	1	1.4	5	---	---	---	---	1.0	2	---	---
Aragonese Regional Party (PAR)	---	---	0.3	1	---	---	0.4	1	0.3	1	0.6	1
Valencian Union (UV)	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.3	1	0.7	2	0.5	1
Canary Coalition (CC)	---	---	---	---	---	---	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.9	4
Others	12.6	9	8.9	3	3.7	---	7.6	1	6.9	---	4.8	---
TOTAL	100.0	350										

Source: Spanish *Ministerio del Interior* and *Junta Electoral Central*.

PSOE: Spanish Socialist Party (Socialist International).

PP: Spanish Popular Party (Christian Democrat International)

UCD: Centrist coalition which disappeared after the 1982 General Election.

CDS: Centrist party created in 1982 (Liberal International).

PCE/IU: Spanish Communist Party/Coalition of PCE, radical socialists and independent leftists (European United Left)

CiU: Centre-right Catalan nationalist coalition (CDC-Liberals and UDC-Christian Democrats).

PNV: Centre-right Basque nationalist party (Christian Democrat International).

HB: Basque independentist coalition and political arm of ETA secessionists.

EE: Basque socialist party which merged with PSE/PSOE in 1993.

EA: Breakaway party from PNV. Centre-left nationalists.

PA: Andalusian nationalist party.

PAR: Aragonese nationalists.

UV: Valencian nationalists.

CC: Multi-party regionalist coalition in the Canary Islands.

ERC: Catalan independentist party.

Table 2: Regional share of Spanish GDP and Spanish population.

	% share of Spanish GDP				Population (1991)	
	1987	1988	1989	1990	Inhabitants	% of total
Catalonia	19.35	19.30	19.36	19.41	5,959,929	15.5
Madrid	16.05	15.82	15.95	16.15	4,845,851	12.6
Andalusia	12.47	12.61	12.65	12.64	6,984,743 (*)	18.2
Valencia	10.44	10.55	10.51	10.47	3,831,197	10.0
Basque Country	6.11	6.09	6.09	6.05	2,093,415	5.4
Castile and Leon	6.03	6.05	5.94	5.95	2,537,495	6.6
Galicia	5.91	5.89	5.88	5.88	2,709,743	7.1
Canary Islands	3.85	3.93	3.84	3.72	1,456,474	3.8
Aragon	3.42	3.39	3.39	3.39	1,178,521	3.1
Castile -La Mancha	3.36	3.35	3.38	3.38	1,650,083	4.3
Asturias	2.79	2.73	2.72	2.69	1,091,093	2.8
Balearic Islands	2.65	2.71	2.69	2.64	702,770	1.8
Murcia	2.23	2.25	2.27	2.28	1,032,275	2.7
Extremadura	1.82	1.82	1.81	1.83	1,050,490	2.7
Navarre	1.51	1.50	1.50	1.50	516,333	1.3
Cantabria	1.28	1.28	1.29	1.29	523,633	1.4
La Rioja	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.73	261,634	0.7
SPAIN	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	38,425,679	100.0

(*) Also includes the population of Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish North-Africa cities

Source: Spanish 1991 Census (*Instituto Nacional de Estadística*) and FIES data (*Fondo para la Investigación Económica y Social*)

Table 3: Territorial sharing of public spending in unitary and federal countries (%).

Federal countries	Central	Regional	Local	TOTAL
Australia (1990)	60.45	34.00	5.55	100.00
Austria (1985)	70.19	3.41	16.40	100.00
Canada (1985)	44.14	40.32	15.54	100.00
Federal Republic of Germany (1990)	58.52	24.55	16.39	100.00
Switzerland (1984)	47.95	29.66	22.39	100.00
USA (1985)	58.77	21.92	19.31	100.00
MEAN PERCENTAGE (*)	56.67 (9.36)	27.31 (9.48)	16.02 (5.69)	
SPAIN (1992)	65.18	21.37	13.45	100.00
Unitary countries	Central	Regional	Local	TOTAL
Belgium (1984)	87.78		12.22	100.00
Denmark (1986)	57.45		42.55	100.00
Finland (1965)	59.56		40.44	100.00
France (1983)	84.39		15.61	100.00
Greece (1981)	95.34		4.66	100.00
Ireland (1984)	75.29		24.71	100.00
Italy (1990)	72.75		27.25	100.00
Luxembourg (1984)	85.38		14.62	100.00
Netherlands (1990)	75.25		24.75	100.00
New Zealand (1981)	87.72		12.28	100.00
Norway (1985)	68.11		31.89	100.00
Sweden (1990)	62.72		37.28	100.00
United Kingdom (1985)	75.85		24.15	100.00
MEAN PERCENTAGE (*)	75.97 (11.81)		24.03 (11.81)	

(*) Unweighed mean. Standard deviation in brackets.

Source: Antoni Castells, IMF (reproduced in *El País*, 6th October, 1991) and author's data.

Table 4: Regional Family Disposable Income expressed as a percentage of the Spanish mean (= 100)

	1977	1982	1992	Variation (77-93)
Madrid	126.9	121.5	109.0	-17
Catalonia	121.2	122.4	122.5	+1.3
Balearic Islands	121.1	127.5	124.4	+3.3
Basque Country	115.7	109.6	99.4	-16.3
Navarre	107.1	104.2	107.1	==
La Rioja	106.0	106.8	113.2	+7.2
Aragon	103.1	101.2	105.6	+2.5
Valencia	102.5	102.7	108.1	+5.6
Asturias	99.3	102.1	95.5	-3.8
Cantabria	98.9	101,2	95.3	-3.6
Castile and Leon	91.1	89.5	93.3	+2.2
Galicia	86.8	88.8	93.5	+6.7
Canary Islands	83.7	90.7	90.1	+6.4
Murcia	83.7	83.3	91.8	+8.1
Castile-La Mancha	81.1	77.9	87.1	+6.0
Andalusia	77.8	79.1	81.6	+3.8
Extremadura	66.9	70.4	76.4	+9.5

Source: Braulio Medel, *El País*, 01.06.93.

Endnotes

1. See, for example, D. Horowitz, D, "Multiracial Politics in the New States: Towards a Theory of Conflict" in R. Jackson & M. Stein (eds.), *Issues in Contemporary Politics*. New York, 1971, and R. Dahl, *Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition*. New Haven, 1971.
2. Art. 2 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution "recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and solidarity amongst them". In general, it is not easy to distinguish conceptually the term "nation" from that of "nationality". Such a terminological distinction was to a great extent a consequence of the dichotomy between "nation-state" and "state of the nationalities" as regards the cases of the Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empires at the beginning of the 20th century. In broad terms, nationality can be referred to as a minority nation which has acceded to a degree of institutional autonomy or independence within a multinational state and which concurs or co-exists with a majority nation and/or other ethnoterritorial groups. On this issue cf. J. Krejčí & V. Velimsky, *Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe*, London, 1981, pp 32-43.
3. The issue of peninsular unity is very much at the core of the history of Spain after the Muslim invasion in the year 711. The conquest of Granada in 1492 and the incorporation of Navarre into Castile in 1515 completed the territorial unification of most of the peninsula under own crowned head (J. Linz, "Early State-Building and the Late Peripheral Nationalisms against the State: the Case of Spain" in S. Eisenstadt, & S. Rokkan (eds.), *Building States and Nations. Models, Analyses and Data across Three Worlds*, Beverly Hills, 1973, pp 32-116). However, the fruitful 'melting pot' of Christians, Jews and Muslims came abruptly to an end once the *Reconquista* was achieved. On the issue of the 'peoples of Spain' cf. J. Caro Baroja, *Los Pueblos de España*, Madrid, 1985 (4th Ed.).
4. Portugal forced a truce with Castile in 1411, after the defeat of the Castilian troops in the Battle of *Aljubarrota*. As a consequence of this, the Portuguese dynasty assured independence for the kingdom which saw a formidable overseas expansion. In 1580 the ruling house died out, and Philip II of Spain became king of Portugal. In 1640, and after a nationalist revolt which brought to power the native house of Bragança, Portugal seceded from the kingdom of Spain.
5. According to such a paradigm, also assumed by 'mainstream' Marxist theorists, the diffusion of cultural and social structural values, coupled with modernization and economic development, should result in a progressive cultural, political and economic integration, replacing territorial cleavages with a set of functional and economic conflicts, namely class conflicts.
6. The traditional political and economic non-congruence in Spain has been translated into a permanent rivalry between centre and periphery. This dichotomy has historically found expression in two main alternative models of state organization: centralist-authoritarian and federalist-democratic. On the type of economic and political non-congruence, see P. Gouveritch, P (1979), "The Re-emergence of 'Peripheral Nationalisms': Some Comparative Speculations of the Spatial Distributions of Political Leadership and Economic Growth" in *Comparative Studies in Sociology and History*, vol 21, 1979, p 306.
7. This regional model was referred to as '*Estado Integral*' by the Republican constitutionalists. See J. Ferrando Badía, *El Estado Unitario, el Federal y el Estado Regional*, Madrid, 1978.
8. For an analysis of the nature of Francoism see S. Giner & E. Sevilla, (1984), "Spain: From Corporatism to Corporatism", in Williams, A (ed.), *Southern Europe Transformed. Political and Economic Change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain*, London, 1984, pp 115-125, and Ll. Flaquer, S. Giner & L. Moreno, "La sociedad española en la encrucijada" in S. Giner, (ed.), *España. Sociedad y Política*, Madrid, 1990, pp 24-36.
9. S. Giner, "Ethnic Nationalism, Centre and Periphery in Spain" in C. Abel, & N. Torrents (eds.), *Spain: Conditional Democracy*, London, 1984, p 87.
10. The conurbation of Barcelona and its surrounding municipalities saw the creation of a multi-purpose metropolitan authority in 1974. In 1986, the metropolitan county of Barcelona, which comprised not only

the city of Barcelona but also twenty-seven municipalities, had a population of 3,025,666 inhabitants. This figure compares with that of 3,058,182 for the city of Madrid. On local government in Spain, cf. T. Clegg, "Spain" in E.C. Page & M.J. Goldsmith (eds.), *Central and Local Government Relations*, London, 1987, pp 130-155, and J. Solé-Vilanova, "Spain: regional and local government" in R. Bennett (ed.), *Territory and Administration in Europe*, London, 1989, pp 205-229.

11. Franco's regime had been subject to an active opposition during the 1960s and 1970s, years when the sociological pattern of a highly urbanised and industrialised Spain had been growing more and more similar to that of the rest of Western European countries. The progressive disparity between Franco's political regime and Spanish society turned into an apparent fracture of state institutions in the first half of the 1970s. On the political transition to democracy in Spain and the subsequent role of the political parties, cf. J.M. Maravall, *The Transition to Democracy in Spain*, London, 1982; L. Moreno, "Las Fuerzas Políticas Españolas" in S. Giner (ed.), *España. Sociedad y Política*, Madrid, 1990, pp 285-314, and P. Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain*, London, 1986.

12. J. García Añoveros, "Autonomías, un proceso abierto" in *El País*, 29th, 30th & 31st May, 1984. Jaime García Añoveros was Minister of Economy in the last centre-right UCD Governments during the period 1979-1982.

13. The Spanish Constitutional Court is inspired by the model proposed by Hans Kelsen for the Austrian Constitution of 1920, which was also adopted by the 1931 Spanish Constitution (II Republic). It also incorporates several aspects of the 1948 Italian Constitution and the German Basic Law, *Grundgesetz*.

14. Due to the Spanish system of proportional representation (D'Hont rule on provincial constituencies for the election of the MPs to the Chamber of Deputies), it is highly unlikely that a single political party could ever achieve three-fifths of the Congress of Deputies. Electoral results for the period 1977-1993 are reproduced in Table 1.

15. The Spanish PSOE (Socialist Party) achieved a landslide victory in the 1982 General Election: 202 MPs for the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House) out of 350 (see Table 1 for the parliamentary results in the period 1977-93). This absolute majority was renewed in the two subsequent general elections held in 1986 and 1989. In June 1993, the Socialists managed to win the elections for the fourth consecutive time although with a relative majority (159 of the total 350). See Table 1.

16. The conceptual boundaries of this theoretical model are put forward in L. Moreno, "Multiple Ethnoterritorial Concurrence in Spain", paper read at the on '*Contemporary Problems of Ethnicity*' organised by the Research Committee on Politics and Ethnicity of the IPSA, University of Colorado at Boulder, July 14-16, 1993. In this paper, concurrence is meant as simultaneous multi-competition out of which widespread agreement might eventually -although not necessarily- be achieved. Thus, ethnoterritorial asymmetry, heterogeneity and plurality are key elements in this semantic interpretation.

17. Art. 138 of the 1978 Constitution observes that the Spanish state must establish "...a just and adequate economic balance between the different areas of Spain". For the modest -but significant- reduction of the gap in the regional family disposable income during the period 1977-1992, see Table 4.

18. 'Premise' is used as providing basis and conditioning the development of subsequent events. Thus, it is not meant as a constituent part of a philosophical syllogism or as a logical proof.

19. See L. Moreno, "Ethnic disparities and Imperfect Federalism in Spain". Paper presented at the XV World Congress of Political Science, Buenos Aires, 21-25 July, 1991, and *Concurrencia Múltiple Etnoterritorial en España*, Madrid, 1992, IESA Working Papers.

20. For instance, on occasion of the 1992 Olympic Games in Barcelona, the Catalan Government of the *Generalitat* financed full-page advertisements in the *Financial Times* in which the geographical location of Barcelona was related to the map of Catalonia with no other particular reference to Spain.

21. This is illustrated by the case of Barcelona, where a majority of city councillors from the Socialist

Party and the United Left coalition (Communists, Radical Socialists and Independent Leftists) support the municipal government. The regional Catalan government of the *Generalitat* is controlled by the nationalists of *Convergència i Unió* (Convergence and Union). In turn, socialists ran central government up to June 1993, when their minority victory at the General Election forced them to seek legislative support from sub-state nationalist parties.

22. D. Elazar, *Exploring federalism*, Tuscaloosa, 1987, p 5.

23. D. Elazar, "Urbanism and Federalism: Twin Revolutions of the Modern Era", *Publius*, 1975, vol 5(2), p 20.

24. *Ibid*, p 21.

25. See L. Moreno, *Decentralisation in Britain and Spain: the cases of Scotland and Catalonia*, Edinburgh, 1986, pp 60-74.

26. J. Linz, "Politics in a Multi-Lingual Society with a Dominant World Language: The case of Spain", in J.G. Savard & R. Vigneault (eds.), *Les états multilingues: problèmes et solutions*. Québec, 195, p 423.

27. See, for example, S. Giner & L. Moreno, "Centro y Periferia: La Dimensión Étnica de la Sociedad Española" in S. Giner (ed.), *España. Sociedad y Política*, Madrid, 1990, pp 169-197.

28. Each Spanish province elects four senators by majority system, each of the seventeen Autonomous Communities also nominates another Senator and, finally, one further Senator is nominated by the nationalities and regions for each million inhabitants of their respective territories.

29. As regards local municipalities, which also enjoy the constitutional principle of autonomy in the running of their own affairs, the 1985 Local Government Act established different levels of compulsory responsibilities depending upon the size of the municipality. In any case, the 1985 Act is very flexible in its provisions concerning the additional areas of government which municipalities could assume.

30. Market forces tend inertially to increase the original geographical imbalance of industrial economic development. Both neoclassical and Keynesian regional theories have often put forward models which assume an eventual "natural" territorial self-balancing. These premises have actually failed to be substantiated, even at the present time when the transnationalization of the world economy could be seen as the means for achieving a more integrated framework which could mitigate regional differences of development.

31. Regions have the power to collect and keep these taxes although they are regulated by the central government. Such ceded taxes includes immovable property transfer tax, death and gift duties, wealth tax and tax stamp duties.

32. The monies from the Interterritorial Compensation Fund are allocated among regions according to objective criteria which include elements such as population, net migration, per capita income, area and level of unemployment.

33. The main debate on this issue faces the so-called "fiscal co-responsibility" between regional and central governments, and the establishment of institutional safeguards which would 'help' those poorer regions with a lower capacity to collect taxes. According to the estimates carried out in Catalonia by Antoni Castells, 20 % of the total money collected by the central government in Catalonia as Income Tax (US\$ 8.5 billion) is equivalent to the amount of the tax-sharing grant in 1991 (US\$ 1.7 billion).

34. This body is composed of all central and regional ministers of the Treasury and has an advisory role in all matters related to the drafting of planning projects, budgetary guidelines, and matters directly concerned with inter-governmental relations (resources for the *Comunidades Autónomas*, public debts limits or block-grants from state revenues).